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Exonerations Change Judicial
Views on Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel by Adele Bernhard

T"

e American public is fascinated with criminal justice. Crime stories titillate. They're the daily fare on
television newscasts, the subject of "true crime"
bestsellers, and the front-page stories in newspapers and
magazines nationwide. Today, it is the story of exonerations
of the wrongly convicted that has captured the public's
imagination. In recent nlonlhs, the New KWICTI'YIZPS
painstalungly explored how a group of young men convicted of raping and assaulting the "Central Park jogger" had
been wrongly convicted--despite their taped confessions.
Ne~vsdaypublished a four-part series on 13 wrongly convicted individuals in New York alone. Pamde maguine featured "It Could Happen to Any of Us," by Jack Newfield,
describing how Ray Krone, a fornler Boy Scout and Little
League ballplayer, was convicted of a niurder he did not
commit in Arizona. PBS aired an hour-long special that
illustrated the post-exoneration lives of wrongly convicted
men. And The Exonerated-a play combining fiction with
real-life events, was an off-Broadway hit.
It is not hyperbole to suggest that the interest and excitement generated by the stream of exoneration stories has
encouraged hundreds of young people to attend law school.
invigoratcd J.D. curriculum, revamped criine laboratories,
and intf ueilced jury verdicts.
Law evolves more slowly than pop culture or public atlitude. Because most exonerations have not resulted in written legal opinions, their impact is oilly slowly seeping into
case law. However, courts are influenced by the same news
that sways the rest of us. Even without explicitly referring
to innocence or wrongful convictions, modern trial courts
are undoubtedly more llkely to admit expert testimony on
the question of eyewitness identification because they are
painfully aware of just how easily such witnesses-no matter how honest or passionate---can be wrong. They are certainly more inclined to view confessions suspiciously, especially when it involves the very young, and to consider
whether and to what extent police slant evidence. Finally,
the fact that innocent people are routinely convicteddespite a full-blown jury trial at which they were represented by defense counsel-suggests that courts should play a
more active role in supervising the quality of crilninal
defense services.
Without overstating the case, there is some evidence that
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courts are doing inore to protect lhe rights of the accused to
effectivc assistance of counsel. Some courts are relaxing the
overly restrictive standard by which i~ldividualpost-conviction claims are judged. Others have become more receptive
to affirmattve litigation challellging the provision of criminal defense services on Sixth Anlendnlent grounds. Finally,
at least one circuit has abrogated the virtual inimunity that
currently protects assigned and public defenders from malpractice liability. This article discusses each of these developments, focusing on the federal courts 'and on New York
State, where 1 live and practice.

Ambivalenceto enforcing right to counsel
Even as its criminal justice jurisprudence has evolved
more restrictively, the Supreme Court has steadfastly insisted that the Constitution requires provision of counsel to
anyone facing a loss of freedom as the result of a ci-iminal
charge. (Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963);
AEabamna Slzclton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002).) Nonetheless, a
right is only as potent as its enforcement, and the vigor of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been undercut by
judicial reluctance to supervise the provision of criminal
defense services. In part, this reticence is due to appropriate
concern for finality and the difticulty of devising a standard
of review that would spare appellate courts the task of
combing through lengthy transcripts looking for trid errors.
But thc reserve can also be attributed to the unstated belief
that excellence in defense services is unnecessary. If everyone is guilty, it doesn't matter who does the defending. As
Richard Posner puts it:
IJ.

I can coilfirm from my own experience as a judge that criminal
defendcan&are generally poorly rcpresented. But if we are to be
hardheaded we must recognize that this may not be an entirely
bad thing. The lawyers wlw represent indigent cri~lunrtldefenh t s seem to be g o d entwgh to reduce the probability of convicting an innocent person to a very low level. If they were
much better, either many guilty people would be acquitted or
society would have to devote much greater resources to the
cases.A bare-bones systenl for defense
prosecution ofc~-iminal
of ~ndigentcriminal defendantsmay be optimal.
(Richard A. Posner, The Pmhlemalics ofMor~12.sand Legal
the or^ 163-64 (1999), cited in Ahhe S~?zitlz,Difference irz
Crirniiztll Dejense arztl! he Diference It Mi~ke,r,11 WASH.
U . J.L. & Poriv 83 (2003).)

Twenty years ago, when the Supreme Court decided

37

Illustration by Susan W~se

H e l n O n l l n e - - 18 C r l m .

Just. 3 7 2 0 0 3 - 2 0 0 4

Strickland I). Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the probability of convicting an innocent person seemed very low
indeed. Our federal and state multilayered criminal justice
systems,
with
pretrial procedures and constitutional protections, were thought to accurately differentiate between guilty persons and innocent ones. Judicial
comfort with the operation of the criminal justice system is
reflected in the Strickland decision, which diminishes the
significance of counsel's role in the trial process. However,
as the courts lose faith in police and prosecutorial ability
(or inclination) to distinguish between the guilty and the
innocent, they are sure to refocus attention on the significance of zealous defen ,e advocacy and search for ways to
defense
to do a better job of advocating
for their clients-so as to reduce the chances of convicting the innocent.

Revisiting Sfrickland
One way to influence the quality of defense services is
to reverse more cases for ineffective assistance of counsel.
Judicial tolerance of malpractice has insulated ineffective
counsel, and the lack of adverse consequences for bad
lawyering has retarded efforts at
reform. Certainly, reversal of an
individual case gives that particular defendant a better shot
at an accurate verdict.
Moreover, every reversal
teaches a general lesson about
counsel's obligations, and
potentially requires a greater
investment in defense
resources.
Currently, for a conviction to be reversed on the
ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, Strickland
requires: 1) that the defense attorney's performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and 2) a
reasonable probability that the malfeasance prejudiced the
outcome of the trial. (See Peter A. Joy and Kevin C.
McMunigal, Has Gideon's Prumise Been Fulfilled?, 18:4
CRIM.JUST.46 (Summer 2003)) In other words, where
there was overwhelming proof of guilt at trial, malpractice will be excused even if that malpractice involved such
egregious behavior as sleeping, taking drugs, or drinking
during trial, suffering through a psychotic break, or any
number of other disasters that have been so extensively
reported by journalists and scholars alike.
Although it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will
overrule Stricklund, recognition that ineffective assistance
of counsel is contributing to convictions of innocent people may spur courts to: ( I) either find prejudice more frequently, or (2) to characterize counsel's error or omission
as egregious enough to avoid a careful prejudice analysis.

r

Focusing on prejudice
Courts could increase the number of circumstances
where malfeasance is presumed to have prejudiced the outof fie trial-withoLlt resorting to a careful weighing
malfeasance against prosecutorial proof. ~h~~~
already three situations where courts will presume prejudice and reverse a conviction without measuring how the
,ttorney perfo1mance affected the outcome. prejudice is
presumed when counsel and client are divided by a
pletely antagonisticrelationship, rising to the level of an
G~rreconcilable
conflict;7 uP7ited
v. M
~ 159 ~ 3 d~
1154 (9th cir, 19~)8),
or when one lawyer actively
sents multiple individuals with inconsistent defenses,
Ctlyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980). Third, and more
relevant lo this discussion, prejudice will be presmed
when an accused can claim legitimately that representation
was so inadequate as to constitute a complete deprivation of
counsel, United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984),
decided with Strickland. The Cronic exception to the
Strickland standard applies to that small number of cases
where there has either been: 1 ) a complete deprivation of
counsel at a critical stage in the life of a criminal case; or 2)
where counsel has been asked
to provide representation in an
unusually Qfficult situation
(such as that which occurred in
Powell v: Alabaina, where a
number of young black men
accused of capital rape in a hostile southern town were
,,igne dcou
before the start of the trial); or
3) where counsel fails "to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing," such as by conceding guilt in closing arguments,
United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070 (9th Cir. 1991).
Although Croizic clearly provides an opening for courts
willing to more strictly scrutinize counsel's performance,
federal courts have been reluctant to step through it. That
may be changing. Recent cases suggest that the federal
bench is more willing to presume prejudice in cases where,
just a few years ago, it would have dismissed claims of
ineffectiveness. For starters, in 2002, the Supreme Court let
stand the Fifth Circuit decision in Bur-dine that condemned
as ineffective a defense attorney's sleeping through parts of
a capital trial. (Cockrell v. Burdine, 535 U.S. 1120 (2002)
(mem.).) There is no doubt that Burdine marks a significant
change, since less than 10 years earlier the Court had
denied relief to another defendant whose attorney had also
slept through long portions of his client's capital trial.
(McFarlund v. Texas, 5 19 U.S. 11 I9 (1 997) (mem.) (denying review of McFarland's capital conviction).) Also last
year, the First Circuit in Ouher v. Guarion, 293 F.3d 19 (I st
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consensus that the Constitution requires effective counsel to
conduct fact investigation is going to be confined to death
penalty jurisprudence. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit has suggested that counsel's significant trial decisions must be supported by a sound strategy, and that a
sound strategy can't be formulated in the absence of an
investigation. (See Eze v. Senkowski, 321 F.3d 110 (2d Cir.
2003) (remanding to district court for factual hearing
because the circuit was 'bnable to assess with confidence
whether strategic considerations accounted for . . . counsel's
decisions.").) In that determination, the circuit relied upon
Strickland's admonition that "as a general matter, strategic
choices made by counsel after a thorough investigation of
the facts and law are 'virtually unchallengeable,' though
strategic choices 'made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable
professional judgment support the limitation on investigation.' " (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91.) Thus, counsel
"has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations
unnecessary." (Id. at 69 1.)
"Where counsel fails to make a reasonable investigation
that is reasonably necessary to the defense, a court must
conclude that the decision not to call an expert [for example] cannot have been based in strategic considerations and
will thus be subject to review under Sfrickland's prejudice
prong." (Pave1 r! Hollins, 261 F.3d 210,223 (2d Cir. 2001)
(counsel ineffective in a child sexual abuse case where his
failure to call a medical expert was based on an insufficient
investigation.).) (Also see Lindstadt v. Keaize, 239 F.3d 191,
201 (2d Cir. 2001) (to the same effect); and Thomas v.
Kuhlrnan, 255 F. Supp. 2d 99 ( E.D.N.Y. 2003) (counsel
failed to investigate the scene of the crime and as a result
did not realize that prosecution witnesses were mistaken in
their testimony, and there could be no strategic rationale for
such an omission.).)
Several circuits in addition to the Second have held similarly that counsel may be deemed ineffective for failure to
conduct an investigation. (See Williams v. Washington, 59
F.3d 673, 680-81 (7th Cir. 1995) (ineffective assistance, in
part, for failure to investigate crime scene where doing so
would have revealed evidence that, "given the layout of the
home and the relatively crowded conditions, the alleged
Requiring counsel to investigate
assault could not have taken place as claimed.");
In a parallel developmnent, some federal courts are conWashington v. Smith, 219 E3d 620 (7th Cir. 2000) (counsel
struing the Sixth Amendment to require defense counsel to
was ineffective when he failed to interview or subpoena
conduct an investigation-at least in certain circ~unstances. alibi witnesses, neglected to read police reports, and did not
This is most dramatically apparent in the recent Supreme
present any semblance of a tactical reason for that minimal
Court case, Wiggins ~z Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527 (2003). which diligence); Matthew v. Abramajrys, 319 F.3d 780, 789 (6th
reversed a capital defendant's death sentence because his
Cir. 2003) (aff~rrningthe district court's grant of petitioner's
counsel did not conduct a thorough investigation of his
habeas petition, because "[Qundamentally, the lawyer in
childhood trauma in preparation for the mitigation hearing.
this case, at best, occupied a space next to his client, but did
Auspiciously, it doesn't look as though the emerging
not assist him. He did nothing to present potential alibi wit-

Cir. 2002), held that an attorney who failed to call her
client, after promising the jury that she would testify, was
ineffective and that the verdict ought to be overturned
despite the court's inability to pinpoint exactly how the
omission impacted the jury's decision.
Courts may be hesitant to use the Cronic exception out
of fear that such analysis will be impracticable, requiring
appellate courts to spend more time scrutinizing trial
records, or necessitating an unacceptable number of reversals. These worries are overstated. New York State has built
a workable ineffective assistance of counsel jurispnidence
on an approach very similar to what Cronic suggests. New
York's highest court has rejected the federal Strickland
standard in favor of its slightly different concept of "meaningful representation," which focuses on the " 'fairness of
the process as a whole rather than [any] particular impact
on the outcome of the case.' " (People v. Herziy, 95 N.Y.2d
563,565 (2000).)
So, for example, New York State's intermediate appellate
court has found -that trial errors-counsel's lack of familiarity with the rules of evidence, failure to review impeachment material, inability to effectively cross-examine witnesses, solicitation of inadmissible identification testimony
during cross-examination, failure to object when inadmissible testimony was elicited on redirect, and misstatement in
summation--can cumulatively deprive a person of meaningful representation without regard for whether that person
would have been convicted in the absence of those errors.
(People v. Cortez, 296 A.D.2d 465,745 N.Y.S.2d 467
(2002); see also Prople 1). Gil, 285 A.D.2d 7,729 N.Y.S.2d
121 (2001) (defense counsel's decision to start trial on the
day of arrai-ment, despite his failure to conduct discovery
or motion practice, is ineffective); People 1: EP?ck Brown,
2002 N.Y. AD LEXIS11617 (2d Dep't 2002) (defendant was
deprived of a fair trial by counsel's failure to prepare for
trial, his inability to effectively cross-examine the complaining witness, his unfamiliarity with the law regarding
the admissibility of prompt outcry; and his indication in
summation that he found the complaining witness's testimony believable).) Thus, New York cases may assist the
federal courts to implement the Cronic exception to the
Strickland prejudice requirement.
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nesses, whose testimony would have been quite useful,
even if not conclusive.); Jennings v. Woodford, 290 F.3d
1000 (9th Cir. 2002) (where there was no basis to conclude
that trial counsel's failure to investigate and present evidence that might have defeated jury's finding of intent and
provided mitigation of the crime at sentence was tactical,
court would find ineffective assistance of counsel.).)
I don't mean to overstate the importance of what are still
only a limited number of decisions, and I'm sure that some
readers will think 1 am being unreasonably optimistic in
characterizing the holdings as a development. Only time
will tell.

Prospectivesystemic litigation gets new life
Another way for courts to enforce the Sixth Amendment
and improve the quality of defense services is through the
use of the injunction. Courts can order institutional change.
Classic and dramatic examples of judge-ordered reform
include transformation of the prison and educational systems. Thus, for years scholars have urged advocacy groups
to undertake structural reform litigation to enforce the right
to effective assistance of counsel. (See Richard J. Wilson,
Litigative Approaches to Er4forcing the Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel irz
Crimivzul Cases, 14 N.Y.U.
REV.L. & SOC.CHANGE
203,
216-17 (1986); Margaret H.
Lemos. Note, Civil Challenaes
"
to the Use of Low-Bid
Contractsfor Indigent Defense,
75 N.Y.U. L. REV.1808 (2000);
Note, Gideon's Promise
Uf@lfilled: The Need for
Litigated Reform of Indigent
Defense, 113 HARV.L. REV. 2062 (2000).)
Of course, bringing systemic litigation is extremely difficult. The Abstention Doctrine prevents federal courts from
intervening in state indigent defense systems, Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and, until recently, state courts
have been hesitant to insert themselves in what can be
described as the legislative domain. (See, e.g., Kennedy v.
Carlson, 5 4 N.W.2d 1 (Mjnn. 1996) (Minnesota Court of
Appeals rejected the Minnesota public defender's request
for additional funds so that his staff could provide services
that comported with constitutional requirements.).)
Nonetheless, judicial reluctance to intervene ill the operation of local criminal court operations may be waning.
Confronted with a lawsuit brought on behalf of all criminai defendants and family court respondents represented by
private assigned counsel, a trial court judge in New York
has done more to improve the cluality of criminal defense
services than the legislat~uehad accomplished in almost
two decades. (New York City Lnwyers'Association v. Pataki,

727 N.Y.S.2d 851 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 2001) (denying the
state's motion to dismiss), ufl'd, 294 A.D.2d 69, 742
N.Y.S.2d 16 (1st Dep't 2002) and 2003 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
453 (Feb. 2003) (granting plaintiff's motion for a mandatory permanent injunction pending further action by the
legislature).)
Sonie backgro~undis necessary to appreciate the significance of the NYCLA decision. Each of New York State's 62
counties pays for and manages its own public defense. New
York City (which includes five counties) provides defense
services to poor people through what is known as a mixed
delivery system. The Legal Aid Society is the primary
defender, representing approxiirately 85 percent of all the
indigent criminal matters. Small, boutique alternate defenders exist in each of the boroughs. Private attorneys are
assigned to handle conflict cases through an assigned counsel plan.
New York City's assigned counsel plans (ACP) have
some excellent characteristics. Full-time administrators
manage the plans. Attorneys seeking to join must meet certain qualifications.A screening committee reviews applications, adjudicates complaints, and has undertaken extensive
recertification drives. Finally, stafl' provides continuing legal
education tailored to the needs
and schedules of the ACP attorneys, and circulates legal
updates and information about
investigators, experts, and alternative to incarceration options
for clients, ow ever, none of
these structural advantages offsets the impact of resource
deprivation. Fees paid to ACP
attorneys were set by the state
in 1986 at $40 an hour for incourt work and $25 an hour for out-of-court work and were
not raised until 2003.
Combined with the high cost of doing business in New
York City, ACP rates were driving attorneys off the criminal
court and family panels. Those attorneys willing to take
assigned work were handling too many cases. Further, the
distinction between in- and out-of-court pay scales discouraged preparation, investigation. and legal research, as well
as client contact.
The New York County Lawyers' Association brought
suit in state court claiming that the low rates violated the
Sixth Amendment rights of those defendants and family
court respondents who were represented by ACP attorneys.
State Supreme Court Justice Lorenzo Suarez rejected the
State's a.rgUment that a decision to raise the rates would
improperly interfere with the State's sovereign ability to
allocate funds. He relied on Lucke?~v. Harris, 860 F.2d
1012 (1lth Cir. 19881, and the New York State standard for

iIIing to
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evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel, to find that the
low rates were adversely impacting the ability of ACP attorneys to provide meaningful assistance, and ordered the state
to raise its rates to $90 an hour for both in- and out-of-court
work.
Justice Suarez reasoned that, while "ordinarily, federal
claims of ineffective assistance are judged case by case,
after conviction, and measured against the Strickland standard," ( 192 Misc. 2d at 429). in New York a different standard prevails. In New York
[wlhile the inquiry focuses oil the quality of the representation
provided to the accused,the claim of ineEectiveness is ultinutely concerned with the fairness of the process as a whole rather
than its paticular impact on the outcome of the case. The purpose is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary
to justify society's reliance on the outcome of the proceedings.
Notably, New York is concemed a5 much with the integrity of
the judicial prcX:es,cas with the issue of guilt or innocence.
(Supra at 43 1-32.) (citations onutted.)
The State of New York imniediately appealed the decision, which stayed the court order raising the rates.
However, the New York legislature didn't wait to see what
would happen, and voted to raise the assigned counsel rates
to $75 for time spent in and out of court.
The New York Supreme Court's willingness to intervene
in the operation of the local criminal justice system and
force a reallocation of funds may result from the growing
consensus that public defense systems are inadequately protecting the rights of the accused.
Litigation designed to improve the quality of criminal
defense services has been successful in other parts of the
country, as well. In 1996, Connecticut's public defender
settled a lawsuit brought by the American Civil Liberties
Union challenging the state indigent defense system. The
settlement raised the fees for private attorneys accepting
those indigent cases that the public defender is unable to
handle and permitted a number of new hires in the office of
the public defense. Five years ago, the ACLU settled a
class-action lawsuit against Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania, with a consent decree designed to overhaul
the public defender's offlce there.
This year in Georgia, the legislature has voted to create
public defender o f ~ c e sin each of the state's 49 counties. It
is fair to say that the state legislature responded to relentless
pressure from the Southern Center for Human Rights,
which had filed a total of six lawsuits seeking systemic
reforms. Litigation designed to improve the quality of criminal defense services is currently pending in Quitman
County, Mississippi, and in Montana where the ACLU of
Montana is alleges that indigent defense services in seven
counties are constitutionally deficient. "The state has failed
to provide the counties with the funding and guidance need-
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ed to administer an indigent defense program adequately,"
said Scott Crichton, executive director of the ACLU of
Montana, in a news release. "Under these circumstances,
even the most diligent attorneys cannot provide competent
representation."

Court holdsthat public defender can be sued
Finally, there is another tool for courts desiring to
enhance the quality of criminal defense services, albeit one
that is bound to be unpopular in the defender community.
Courts could make it easier to sue public defenders for
malpractice-especidly when administrative decisions contributed to it.
Although defenders aren't guaranteed the sane kind of
immunity that shields judges, police, and prosecutors from
civil liability for errors made in the course of fulfilling their
responsibilities, courts have made it difficult for criminal
defendants to sue their counsel. On the one hand, the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that when a public defender is performing the traditional role of an individual attorney for an
individual client, that lawyer is not a state actor and is thus
not amenable to suit under the federal civil rights laws.
(Polk County v. Dodsoiz, 454 U.S. 3 12 (198 I).) On the
other hand, it is equally difficult to sue a public defender
under state malpractice tort theory. Not only are claims of
legal malpractice cumbersome to bring and difficult to
prove, but also many states treat individual public defenders as civil servants with individual immunity (Scott v. City
oJ'Niagaru Fulls, 407 N.Y.S.2d 103, 105 (1978) (holding
that there is "no valid reason to extend . . . immunity to
state and federal prosecutors and judges and to withhold it
from state-appointed and state-subsidized defenders.).)
Further, damages won against public defender offices are
often capped.
Commentators deplore these protections, which some
see as an abridgment of the rights of the accused. (See
Harold Chen, Malpractice Immunity: An Illegitimatr and
IneJtective Response to the Indigent-Defense Crisis, 45
DUKEL.J. 783 (1996); David Sadoff, The Public Defender
as Private Offmder: A Retreat from Evolving Malpractice
Liability Standurds jbr Public Defenders, 32 AM. CRIM.L.
REV.883 (Spring 1995); David J. Richards, The Public
Dqfender Defenclnnt: A Model Statutory Approach to
Public Defender Malpractice Liability, 29 VAL.U. L. REV.
5 11 (Fall 1994).) Their voices are being heard.
In Nevada, an accused individual whose conviction had
been reversed for ineffective assistance of counsel and
whose indictment was subsequently dismissed-although
not on grounds of innocence-brought suit in the federal
district court against his individual public defender, the
office that trained and supervised him, and the county that
f ~ ~ n d the
e d office. (Miranda v. Clark County, 3 19 F.3d
465 (9th Cir. 2003).) Miranda claimed that the chief

-
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defender required lie detector tests to be administered to
all of his clients, and provided fewer investigative and
defense resources to those who failed. Miranda alleged
that this policy was not an isolated instance, but a deliberate pattern and policy-part of a general refusal to properly train and supervise lawyers. Miranda claimed that no
investigation was conducted on his case as a result of the
test results. (Id. at 468.)
Affirming the district court determination, the Ninth
Circuit found that Miranda's allegations, if proven, would
be sufficient to establish against the public defender
office and the county a claim of deliberate indifference to
constitutional rights, reachable under the leading
Supreme Court decisions on state and municipal liability,
such as Monell v. Departmerzt of Social service^, 436
U.S. 658 (1978).
I doubt there is another public defender office that
uses polygraph tests as Nevada is alleged to have done.
But all individual public defenders prioritize cases and
allocate resources in some way. They must. No one can
carry the caseloads that defenders shoulder without decid-

ing which clients are going to get the most attention.
Most public defender organizations provide little guidance
to their staff about making those decisions and fail to
review the decisions that are made. It seems entirely plausible that other innocent clients, upon release from jail, will
sue for failing to investigate, to devote resources, or to train
and evaluate staff. The Miranda v. Clark Courlty decision
condemned an affirmative policy as systemically ineffective, but there is no reason why another organization's
omissions or failures might not likewise be considered
bureaucratic malfeasance establishing liability.
Exonerations of innocent individuals have taught the
public and the courts to be more demanding of the police
and the prosecutors. The police are already paying for
careless work through larger jury verdicts and settlements. (In February 2003, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a
$15 million jury verdict in favor of James Newsome, a
wrongly convicted man.) The defense bar may find itself
in the same position soon. The public will detnand better
performance from the defense bar, and the courts will
enforce those demands.

